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Introduction 
 
With the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, a novel question of 
procedural law has taken the legal arena by storm: how do we effectively apply 
traditional concepts of personal jurisdiction to the seamless world of cyberspace? In a 
world where politically recognized territorial boundaries will typically lead the discussion 
into where a party may be haled into court as a result of its activities, the Internet presents 
us with an anomaly of that traditional principle. Courts are now being launched into the 
unchartered waters of cyberspace where the traditional concept of personal jurisdiction 
often finds itself lost at sea.  
Over the past six years, American courts have been forced to grapple with a 
multitude of questions involving personal jurisdiction and the Internet in the United 
States. However, with websites accessible to virtually anyone in the world, how can a 
business predict where its Internet activity will ultimately end up in the stream of 
commerce overseas? Should a California corporation be required to foresee with any 
degree of certainty whether its Internet activities will cause tortious effects in 
Pennsylvania, or across the Atlantic Ocean in France? Should that corporation be held 
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liable for damages if such effects indeed occur? How can an American company protect 
itself from being subject to the potentially costly and inconvenient personal jurisdiction 
of courts in distant states or foreign nations? 
The rise in popularity of the Internet as a means of doing business across both 
domestic as well as international borders has opened the door to an increasing number of 
legal conflicts. As the number of Internet users grows globally, there will likely be a 
commensurate increase in the amount of legal turbulence surrounding online business 
activities conducted-intentionally or unintentionally-across jurisdictional lines. With the 
dawn of a new brand of litigation comes the need to evaluate the current standards of 
personal jurisdiction, and to determine if they provide sufficient legal certainty upon 
which individuals and businesses wishing to conduct international Internet commerce 
may rely.  
Surprisingly there is scarcely any literature available that addresses the question 
of how to solve today's Internet personal jurisdiction problems on an international level. 
There is, however, an abundance of literature discussing the development of personal 
jurisdiction in America and the problems faced by courts in adjudicating domestic 
Internet disputes. This paper emphasizes the need to carry this discussion beyond our 
own borders and to consider the serious legal consequences that typical Internet conduct 
can have internationally. These consequences can be particularly severe for individuals 
who conduct business over the Internet. Electronic commerce can have widespread 
effects in other countries, subjecting businesses to the costly and time-consuming 
litigation necessary to adjudicate threshold questions of jurisdiction. Often times this 
litigation will occur in unfamiliar legal systems or in distant courtrooms, thus increasing 
the cost and inconvenience of settling Internet disputes. Consequently, individuals and 
businesses are faced with grave uncertainty and the continuous vulnerability of being 
haled into court halfway around the world. Against this backdrop, we must expand the 
discussion of how to solve international personal jurisdiction disputes while providing 
more certainty to individuals engaged in online commerce across national borders.  
On a domestic level, scholars and commentators have suggested numerous 
solutions to help reduce the uncertainty surrounding the issue of Internet personal 
jurisdiction. Many writers propose conservative solutions that preserve the traditional 
concepts of personal jurisdiction but change the mechanisms in which those concepts 
operate. For instance, one writer suggests a system of registration by which a party could 
choose an appropriate forum in which to be sued, or else submit to traditional 
jurisdictional analyses.1  Another writer suggests that the existing due process analysis is 
flexible enough to protect defendants, but that the "fair play and substantial justice" prong 
will become the primary consideration for courts.2  Alternatively, authors have proposed 
more radical approaches to analyzing and adjudicating cases where personal jurisdiction 
is in dispute, such as the creation of a cybercourt to be used in conjunction with a 
registration system to handle any matters resulting from the Internet.3 Still other authors 
express a desire to refrain from altering the current system of Internet personal 
jurisdiction as it has developed through American case law to date, instead advocating 
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employment of the Zippo test, "effects test" and "totality of contacts" analysis as most 
efficient tools for analyzing Internet personal jurisdiction cases.4  
While each of these approaches provides us with a valuable contribution towards 
finding an appropriate solution for analyzing personal jurisdiction over Internet users 
domestically, we must not end our dialogue there. As the Internet brings members of the 
global economy closer together and international business transactions increase via the 
Internet, so does the need for a solution which provides a business conducting activities 
online with more legal certainty regarding where it may be haled into court should a 
foreign party bring suit against it. 
The primary purpose of this note is to examine the current status of personal 
jurisdiction laws as they pertain to individuals conducting commercial activities 
internationally over the Internet, and to propose solutions for reducing the legal 
uncertainties and risks involved with such activities, particularly when those activities 
have effects upon Internet users situated in other countries. Any discussion analyzing 
personal jurisdiction on an international scale must begin with an understanding of how 
our courts have dealt with the issue domestically. Thus, the first section of this note 
examines the development of personal jurisdiction and how that concept has been applied 
to recent Internet cases in the United States. The next section looks at the recent French 
judgment against Yahoo!, Inc. and the ongoing litigation as a case study in illustrating the 
risks inherent in conducting business over the Internet, as well the shortcomings of 
current available standards for analyzing personal jurisdiction when Internet disputes 
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arise.5 Next, this note explores the hurdles that must be overcome in order to progress 
towards a more manageable, predictable and uniform standard for analyzing personal 
jurisdiction over the Internet. The note concludes by proposing solutions to either (1) 
work towards the creation of an international treaty that will provide a central forum in 
which parties in contracting states agree to submit to personal jurisdiction over any 
disputes arising specifically from activities over the Internet, or in the alternative, (2) to 
make our shoe more international in respect to Internet activities. In regards to this 
second solution, I suggest that the current standard of personal jurisdiction employed by 
U.S. courts may be too restrictive a tool in adjudicating international Internet disputes, 
and therefore may require technical modification in order to adequately deal with 
transnational Internet litigation. These solutions represent approaches at both the 
conservative as well as the radical end of the jurisdictional spectrum. However, it is 
useful to consider both alternatives in light of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. 
  
I. The Development and Contemporary Application of Personal Jurisdiction Law 
    A. Personal Jurisdiction Law in the United States: An Overview 
Today's concept of personal jurisdiction finds its genesis in the Supreme Court 
opinion of International Shoe v. Washington.6 The case represented a break away from 
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the inflexible territorial presence rule articulated decades before in Pennoyer v. Neff.7 
Under International Shoe, a defendant located without the jurisdiction of a particular 
court may only be subjected to in personam jurisdiction of that court in accord with the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that the defendant have 
"certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"8 The Due Process analysis is 
essentially a two-prong test which a court must satisfy before it may acquire personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant.9 The first prong of the analysis involves determining 
whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the parties and the forum state.10 The 
second prong requires that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant "does not offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"11 It is important to note that a 
court will only reach the Due Process analysis if it has been granted such power by the 
enactment of a state long-arm statute.12 Some states have enacted long-arm statutes 
allowing the fullest exercise of personal jurisdiction permitted by the U.S. Constitution.13  
However, if the forum state uses a more limited, enumerated long-arm statute, 
then the court must first determine whether personal jurisdiction over a given defendant 
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would be permissible under state law.14 Only then will the court proceed to determine 
whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause.15  
While the two-prong test articulated in International Shoe and World-Wide 
Volkswagen is typically the starting point for a court's determination of whether or not to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the analysis does not necessarily end 
here. The court must consider which type of personal jurisdiction it can exercise over the 
defendant. If a defendant has maintained "continuous and systematic" activities in the 
forum state,16 then the International Shoe test is satisfied and he will therefore be subject 
to general jurisdiction in the courts of that state regardless of whether or not the cause of 
action arose from those activities. However, if his activities do not rise to such a level, 
then the court must be able to exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant by finding 
that his activities were specifically related to the claim.17 In order to exercise specific 
jurisdiction, a court must find that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting business in the forum state.18 Thus, where a defendant has created 
"continuing obligations"19 with residents of the forum state and his activities are 
"shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's laws" it is reasonable to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over him.20  
While the "purposeful availment" factor21 is usually the primary focus in any 
personal jurisdiction analysis, another important factor in deciding whether to require a 
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16  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984).  
17  Id. at 414.  
18  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).  
19  Id. at 476 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)). 
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defendant to litigate in the forum state is reasonableness.22 Under this analysis, it is not 
enough for a defendant to simply foresee that his conduct might subject him to personal 
jurisdiction in the forum state.23 If this were the case, then "every seller of chattels would 
in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process."24 Rather, "the foreseeability 
that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection 
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there."25 Finally, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court of California26 held that the defendant must purposefully direct his 
actions towards the forum state.27 This requires something more than a defendant's 
awareness that "the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum 
state."28 In articulating its "stream of commerce plus" principle of personal jurisdiction, 
the Court suggested that additional conduct by the defendant might indicate an intent to 
serve the forum state, such as designing the product to serve the market of the forum 
state, advertising in the forum state, establishing channels through which advice is 
regularly given to customers in the forum state, or marketing the product through a 
distributor in the forum state.29  
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      As the following sections illustrate, the concepts of purposeful availment, 
foreseeability and reasonableness have become key factors for U.S. courts analyzing 
personal jurisdiction in Internet disputes. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Age 
      The traditional concept of personal jurisdiction outlined above is designed 
primarily for a world where jurisdictions are delineated by territorial and geographical 
boundaries. Thanks to the abundance of lower court and somewhat insightful Supreme 
Court opinions on the subject, personal jurisdiction analysis benefits from a reasonable 
degree of certainty when litigants who conduct business across discernable state and 
national lines are called to appear before courts of another jurisdiction. However, the 
Internet presents courts with a new seamless cyber-landscape which acts as a vehicle for 
national and international commerce without the benefit of noticeable physical 
boundaries. Herein lies the problem created for personal jurisdiction analysis in the new 
millennium. 
      Courts have always been aware of the potential for changing technological 
conditions and the need for a flexible standard to encompass those changes. In Hanson v. 
Denckla,30 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the flexible standard of International 
Shoe was created in response to technological changes, particularly the increased flow of 
commerce between States as well as progress in communication and transportation.31  
       As the next section of this paper illustrates, courts during the last five years have 
attempted to apply that very same standard to encompass the immense expanse of 
cyberspace. While the history of cases addressing personal jurisdiction over the Internet 
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is relatively short, it is useful (and quite interesting) to examine the rubrics employed by 
courts in determining what level of activity satisfies the minimum contacts analysis. A 
survey of the early Internet cases begins to reveal some of the weaknesses inherent in our 
current standard of International Shoe when applied to Internet disputes across 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
           1. The Early Internet Jurisdiction Cases 
      One of the first cases to address personal jurisdiction and the Internet was Inset 
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.32 Plaintiff, a Connecticut software company, sued in 
a federal district court in Connecticut alleging trademark infringement.33 Defendant, a 
Massachusetts computer technology company, allegedly used plaintiff's trademark as an 
Internet domain name address.34 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.35 Defendant claimed it did not have minimum contacts in 
Connecticut since it had no employees or offices within Connecticut, and otherwise 
conducted no regular business there.36 Plaintiff argued that defendant's continuous 
display of an advertisement for its company on the website which included a toll-free 
telephone number was enough to satisfy minimum contacts in Connecticut.37  
The court held for plaintiff, stating that defendant had purposefully availed itself 
of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in Connecticut.38 According to the 
court, defendant could have reasonably foreseen being haled into court in Connecticut 
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since its advertisement was permanent and could be viewed by anyone at anytime.39 The 
court noted that such an advertisement could reach up to 10,000 Internet users in 
Connecticut alone.40 Despite the court's attempt to quantify the potential number of users 
who might access the defendant's website, the court's analysis here nevertheless seems to 
suggest that almost any website can cause its owner to be haled into court should a 
resident of the forum State claim injury.  
Other courts quickly followed suit on the heels of Inset, although they ultimately 
adopted slightly different standards. In Maritz, Inc., v. Cybergold, Inc.,41 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri exercised personal jurisdiction 
over defendant, a California corporation that allegedly committed trademark infringement 
over the Internet.42 The court based its power to hale defendant into Missouri upon the 
state's long-arm statute which provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
persons who commit a tortious act within the state.43 The court considered the website 
carrying the infringing trademark a tortious act, as it caused economic injury upon 
plaintiff in Missouri.44 The court then found that defendant's contacts were "of such a 
quality and nature" that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate Due 
Process.45 Also, the court noted that since defendant transmitted information into 
Missouri approximately 131 times, defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
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of conducting business within the state.46 Compared to the Connecticut court's analysis in 
Inset discussed supra, the Missouri court, in examining the "quality and nature" of the 
website, suggests a higher threshold requirement for a finding of purposeful availment 
sufficient to hale defendant into court. 
     In 1997, in TELCO Communications, Inc. v. An Apple a Day, Inc.47 a Virginia federal 
district court also followed the analysis of Inset in holding that online advertising was a 
"persistent course of conduct" satisfying the state's long-arm statute.48 Since Apple had 
placed allegedly defamatory press releases on a business wire Internet service which 
served Virginia, the court found that the defamation action occurred inside the forum 
state.49 Defendant's activities were considered analogous to physical presence within the 
state, and therefore Apple could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in 
Virginia.50 The court's "physical presence" analogy suggests a relatively low threshold 
requirement upon which to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants.  
In fact, one might read the court's opinion as suggesting that a website operator 
can be served process in any jurisdiction where users have access to its site. This rule 
would subject website operators to the exercise of transient jurisdiction. Such a test could 
have serious implications for anyone considering engaging in electronic transactions from 
anywhere in the country (and perhaps anywhere in the world). 
      The divergent analyses adopted in each of these cases should raise red flags for 
anyone seeking to apply a uniform standard of personal jurisdiction to Internet disputes. 
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Slightly different standards, like those employed in the cases above, can have 
dramatically different consequences for defendants depending upon where the plaintiff 
resides. As mentioned above, such problems suggest that the standards embodied in 
International Shoe may be nearing their practical limits as they are tested in the Internet 
age.  
       These early cases represent the most conservative end of the jurisdictional spectrum, 
finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper where defendants merely 
operated a passive advertising website. However, moving towards the other end of the 
spectrum, some courts have found it much more acceptable to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants only where more traditional contacts with the forum state 
could be found. Among the more traditional contacts found to support the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction include: the advertisement of products both online and in trade 
magazines within the forum state,51 trips to the forum state, the conducting of mail, fax 
and telephone correspondence with residents of the forum state,52 and as explored in the 
next section, entering into contractual relationships with individuals and Internet access 
providers within the forum state.53  
          2. The Zippo Sliding Scale: A Tool of Website Categorization 
In 1997, in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,54 a Pennsylvania 
federal district court formulated a "sliding scale" test whereby the likelihood that personal 
jurisdiction could be exercised over a defendant was "directly proportionate to the nature 
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and quality of commercial activity [a defendant] conducts over the Internet."55 This 
sliding scale was an attempt to summarize the existing case law on the subject of personal 
jurisdiction and the Internet.56 In Zippo, plaintiff was Zippo Manufacturing Company 
("Zippo"), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Bradford, 
Pennsylvania.57 Zippo filed a complaint against defendant Zippo Dot Com, Inc. ("Dot 
Com"), a California corporation with its principal place of business in Sunnyvale, 
California.58 The complaint alleged that Dot Com committed trademark dilution, 
infringement, and false designation under the Federal Trademark Act, as well as dilution 
under state law, for its use of the word "Zippo" in the company's domain name address, in 
various locations on its website, and in Internet newsgroup messages.59  
Dot Com moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the case.60 In denying Dot Com's motion, 
the court engaged in an intricate discussion of the development of personal jurisdiction 
and its application to the Internet, ultimately fitting the matter into what it called the 
"doing business over the Internet" category of cases.61 In exercising personal jurisdiction 
over Dot Com, the court concluded that defendant's conducting of electronic commerce 
with Pennsylvania residents amounted to "purposeful availment of doing business in 
Pennsylvania."62  
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Specifically, the court noted that Dot Com contracted with approximately 3,000 
individuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania, finding that Dot Com 
intended to conduct business within the state and was in full control of the transmission 
of files to Pennsylvania residents.63 Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant comported with both the Pennsylvania long-arm statute and the Due Process 
Clause since both the cause of action and resulting injury occurred in Pennsylvania, and it 
was not unreasonable to require Dot Com to defend itself in Pennsylvania.64  
  The key to the court's analysis in Zippo is the sliding scale test of Internet activity. 
The court suggests that at the most conservative end of the spectrum are "passive 
websites" that do little more than to offer information to Internet users and thus are free 
from the exercise of personal jurisdiction.65 The middle ground consists of interactive 
websites where Internet users can exchange information through the site itself. Here, the 
ability to exercise jurisdiction depends upon the "level of interactivity and commercial 
nature of the exchange of information" through the website.66 Finally, at the other end of 
the spectrum is the "active website" in which a defendant is actively doing business over 
the Internet.67 The court placed the Zippo case into this third category in order to find the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction proper over the California defendant.68
Since the Zippo decision, courts have grappled with the task of trying to fit 
websites into one of the three categories outlined by Zippo. At either end of the Zippo 
spectrum, a majority of courts have formulated reasonably predictable tests to guide the 
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personal jurisdiction analysis.69 However, the area that has generated the most 
controversy among courts involves fitting cases into Zippo's "middle ground" category, 
which turns upon an evaluation of the "level of interactivity and commercial nature" of 
the information exchanged via the website.70  
While the Zippo test has suffered divergent judicial analyses and considerable 
erosion of its clear-line rule with respect to the "middle ground" category, it appears that 
whenever a website is a commercial setting over which business is conducted, courts will 
exercise personal jurisdiction.71 Many courts have found the use of the "something more" 
test attractive, finding that interactive websites will generate sufficient minimum contacts 
whenever a company engages in additional conduct within the forum state reminiscent of 
the more traditional "pre-Internet" minimum contacts (i.e., advertising within the forum 
state or entering into contracts with citizens of the forum state).72  
At least one commentator suggests that the courts' inconsistent analyses of 
Internet cases over the past five years indicates that the traditional basis for establishing 
personal jurisdiction simply does not function effectively in the context of Internet 
activities.73 Another writer calls the Zippo categories "enigmatic" since the test does not 
take into account contacts such as e-mail and message databases, and does not consider 
                                                 
69  See e.g. Amberson Holdings v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 F. Supp. 2d 332 
(D.N.J. 2000); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); 
Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Colt Studio, Inc. v. 
Badpuppy Enter., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
70  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  
71  See Exon, supra note 1, at 22. 
72  See Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
73  See Exon, supra note 1, at 42. 
the cause of action where the standard for injury will vary greatly between lawsuits 
involving tort versus contract litigation, for example.74
     In examining the American courts' struggle to agree upon concrete rules of personal 
jurisdiction analysis involving Internet activities, one might conclude that the threads of 
International Shoe are being stretched to their limits. This concern is exacerbated when 
we begin to discuss Internet activities that have their effects not only in other States, but 
also in other countries. The following section explores the risks of conducting business 
over the Internet where a website is accessible in virtually any country in the world. 
          3. The Yahoo! Case: A Digital Culture Clash  
On November 20, 2000, the County Court of Paris entered final judgment in a 
case against Yahoo!, Inc., a California-based company, in a suit involving the online 
giant's auction site.75 The case arose when the International League Against Racism and 
the Union of French Jewish Students filed suit in French court arguing that Yahoo!'s 
auction site violated a French law barring the sale of racist materials.76 The plaintiffs 
alleged that Yahoo! placed Nazi-related memorabilia on its auction site, which was 
accessible by French users.77 The principal issue was whether French law permitted the 
exhibition or sale of items that cause or promote racial hatred.78 In the case, LICRA v., et 
al. v. Yahoo!, Inc.,79 Judge Jean-Jacques Gomez of the French court ordered Yahoo! to 
                                                 
74  See Rothman, supra note 2, at 148 (suggesting that the Zippo categories are "hardly 
determinative" and "downright misleading" in a personal jurisdiction analysis.) 
75  See Brendon Fowler et al., Can You Yahoo!? The Internet's Digital Fences, 12 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. (2001). 
76  See Keith Perine, Yahoo Asks U.S. Court to Rule French Court Out of Bounds, THE 
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2000. 
77  See Fowler et al., supra note 75. 
78  Id. 
79  T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, aff'd, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000. 
block all French users from accessing the Nazi-related materials or face penalties of 
100,000 francs a day, or approximately U.S. $13, 948.80 Although Yahoo!'s French 
mirror site already blocked French users from accessing the Nazi-related materials, the 
court's ban extended to Yahoo!'s United States sites, as well.81 While the French court 
acknowledged the protection given to such materials in the United States under the First 
Amendment, the court nevertheless based its jurisdiction upon the assertion that Yahoo! 
"addressed French parties … by transmitting advertising banners written in the French 
language."82 The order essentially requires Yahoo! to police both the information placed 
on its website by private parties and the geographical location of the parties who then 
access that information.83
  In response to Judge Gomez's order, Yahoo! filed for a declaratory judgment in 
U.S. District Court in San Jose, California, claiming that the French government lacks 
personal jurisdiction over the California company and that the French order was thus 
unenforceable.84 Yahoo! also argued that the French court order violates the First 
Amendment and the Communication Decency Act's immunization from liability for 
third-party content placed on an Internet service provider.85 Finally, Yahoo! asserted a 
technological defense, stating that it would be physically impossible to implicate the 
French court's ban given the nature of the Internet.86 Essentially, Yahoo! argued that the 
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81 See Fowler et al., supra note 75. 
82  LICRA, et al. v. Yahoo!, Inc., T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, aff'd, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 
2000. 
83 See Fowler et al., supra note 75. 
84  Id.  
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
only way to ensure that French users did not access the materials on the international 
website was to prohibit everyone in the world from accessing it.87  
     Responding to Yahoo!'s motion for a declaratory judgment, the French organizations 
in turn filed their own motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On June 7, 
2001, Judge Jeremy Fogel of the U.S. District Court in San Jose entered an order denying 
the French parties' motion to dismiss.88 The court exercised personal jurisdiction over the 
French defendants, stating that the foreign defendants purposefully availed themselves of 
the forum state by 1) sending a cease and desist order to Yahoo!'s Santa Clara 
headquarters, 2) requesting that Yahoo! be required to perform specific acts in Santa 
Clara, and finally, by 3) utilizing United States Marshals to effect service of process on 
Yahoo! in California.89 The court concluded that the American court is the more efficient 
and effective forum in which to decide the question of "whether the French order is 
enforceable in the United States in light of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States."90
     Yahoo! won its greatest victory on November 7, 2001, when Judge Fogel entered his 
final order refusing to recognize the French ban on Yahoo!'s website and granting 
Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment.91 The court held that it was inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States for another nation to regulate speech by a 
United States resident within the United States on the basis that such speech can be 
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accessed by Internet users in another nation.92 The court noted that this case was 
"uniquely challenging" since the Internet "in effect allows one to speak in more than one 
place at the same time."93 The court discussed the concept of comity, acknowledging that 
United States courts generally recognize foreign judgments "unless enforcement would 
be prejudicial or contrary to the country's interests."94 Essentially, the court concluded 
that there was no way it could enforce the French order in the United States without 
violating the First Amendment freedom of speech. 
Although the court decided the case primarily upon Constitutional grounds and 
principles of comity, the opinion did leave the door open for the possibility that some 
international legislation might change the result in this case. The court suggested that:       
[a]bsent a body of law that establishes international standards with respect to speech 
on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of 
such standards to speech originating within the United States, the principle of comity 
is outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First Amendment. The 
court expresses no opinion as to whether any such treaty or legislation would or could 
be constitutional.95
  The court's suggestion strikes an important chord that is relevant to our discussion 
of how to find a manageable solution to the problems plaguing international personal 
jurisdiction analysis over the Internet. The court hints at a point of central importance to 
any discussion regarding the enactment of international legislation for the Internet: 
constitutionality. This issue is explored more carefully later in the paper. 
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The Yahoo! case illustrates the increasing difficulty of reconciling the growth of 
the Internet with divergent international laws. As of yet, there exists no international 
court to assert jurisdiction over the operators of websites and Internet service providers.96 
This results in a tug of war between the various potential forums and parties to litigation, 
all wishing to protect their citizens to the greatest extent possible. In addition, Yahoo! 
illustrates the lack of clear, manageable standards on jurisdiction over the Internet. One 
might conclude that the court in Yahoo! was forced to resort to the age-old (and 
sometimes vague) principle of comity for lack of a more predictable test for adjudicating 
Internet disputes. As the Yahoo! court suggested, the dispute presents "novel and 
important issues arising from the global reach of the Internet" as well as "issues of policy, 
politics, and culture that are beyond the purview of one nation's judiciary."97
The Yahoo! case also demonstrates the significant risks involved in operating a 
website since it is accessible virtually anywhere in the world, often simultaneously by 
Internet users in many different countries. More importantly, however, Yahoo! shows us 
just how difficult it would be to apply the Zippo sliding scale test to such a unique set of 
facts. Generally, under the Zippo test, the operation of an interactive website does not 
generate sufficient minimum contacts in the forum state without some examination of 
"the nature and quality of commercial activity" conducted over the Internet.98  
As discussed supra, the archetypical case to which the Zippo test has been applied 
involves websites through which a company sold items to consumers, thus targeting the 
forum state in a manner more satisfactory of Due Process requirements. However, in the 
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Yahoo! case, the auction website at issue is one in which all transactions occur between 
two individual consumers who have unilaterally chosen to utilize Yahoo! as nothing more 
than a vehicle of transmission to one another. Into which Zippo category would cases like 
Yahoo! fall?  
Auction websites are abundant on the Internet, as well as similar websites on 
which users can post products for sale online, trade digitally downloaded music with one 
another, place personal ads on dating services, or simply engage in user group 
discussions in real-time chat rooms or bulletin boards on any given topic. Where do we 
place such "third-party medium" websites in the Zippo sliding scale rubric? Future 
litigation involving these kinds of websites will no doubt test the limits of Zippo and 
enlighten us on the adequacy of the test as a solution to the traditional International Shoe 
standard. 
II. Looking Ahead: New Approaches to Internet Personal Jurisdiction 
1. General Problems With Drafting a Uniform International Treaty 
      In searching for a solution to the jurisdictional dilemma facing courts in 
international Internet disputes, one might suggest drafting an international treaty to 
address the problems surrounding the standard of personal jurisdiction and the 
recognition of judgments. Currently there is no such treaty in existence that will apply 
concrete, uniform rules to resolve disputes arising out of Internet activities having effects 
across international borders.99 However, the task of drafting an international treaty in this 
area may prove more problematic than helpful. One of the most significant obstacles to 
drafting such a treaty may be the fear of being locked into a standard governing a novel, 
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technological issue which has not yet been resolved in most national legal systems (i.e. 
the United States).100 This fear of being locked into such a new rule is exacerbated in 
regards to the United States since under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
treaties, if implemented, will become the supreme law of the land.101  
Another obstacle emerges from the varying standards of personal jurisdiction and 
recognition among different nations. While the Zippo test incorporates the International 
Shoe standard of establishing sufficient minimum contacts in order to satisfy the Due 
Process requirement of the U.S. Constitution, such a test is not easily applicable in an 
international context, where many countries have adopted markedly different standards 
for personal jurisdiction. 
      To illustrate the way in which differences between personal jurisdiction standards 
could prove troublesome to the task of drafting an international Internet treaty, one need 
look no further than the European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, popularly known as the Brussels 
Convention.102 There are currently 15 members of the European Community, which 
comprise the contracting states of the Brussels Convention.103 Completed in 1968, the 
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Regulations went into effect and thus replaced the current draft of the Brussels 
Convention. One of the effects of this legislation was to create implied consent to be 
subject to the Brussels Regulations upon any state's future entrance into the European 
Brussels Convention provides the rules for both personal jurisdiction and the recognition 
of judgments for "civil and commercial matters" for parties domiciled in contracting 
states.104 There is a stark difference regarding personal jurisdiction analysis between U.S. 
law and the Brussels Convention. While the U.S. Due Process analysis focuses upon the 
relationship between the court of the forum state and the defendant, the Brussels 
Convention focuses upon the relationship between the court of the forum state and the 
claim.105 The focus of the Brussels Convention between the court and the claim "would 
lead to jurisdiction likely in violation of the Due Process Clause under U.S. law."106  
This divergence in personal jurisdictional analysis can be explained in part by the 
civil law system's preference for predictable and efficient standards, rather than the less 
predictable, more malleable (and often more litigated) standard adopted by U.S. courts. In 
addition, unlike many other countries, the U.S. has constitutionalized its system of 
personal jurisdiction. Consequently, jurisdictional analysis under the 14th Amendment 
Due Process Clause, which is so deeply engrained in our system of jurisprudence, is not 
likely susceptible to change in the near future. 
      Additionally, the Brussels Convention prohibits the use of transient jurisdiction, 
or "tag" jurisdiction,107 as well as general "doing business" jurisdiction,108 which are both 
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106  Id. at 512. 
107  See European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, art. 3, 33, 41 O.J. EUR. COMM. (C27/1) (Jan. 26, 1998). ("Tag 
jurisdiction" refers to the concept of transient jurisdiction, which allows a court to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely upon his physical presence within the 
well-settled grounds for personal jurisdiction under U.S. law. In light of such distinctions 
in the fundamental concept of personal jurisdiction between the United States and the 
European Community alone, it becomes apparent just how challenging a task it would be 
to draft a uniform international treaty on Internet personal jurisdiction, particularly one 
which encompasses all these varying concepts. In fact, the United States and members of 
the European Community are currently negotiating a treaty that could potentially cover 
issues of intellectual property and electronic commerce. The following discussion 
explores some of the hurdles that the treaty delegates have been struggling with in recent 
years. 
2. The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
In May, 1992, Edwin Williamson, then U.S. Department of State legal adviser, 
sent a letter to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference suggesting negotiations on 
a multilateral treaty which would address issues of jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments on an international scale.109 In October 1996, the negotiations for a Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
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were officially placed on the conference agenda.110 Since then, the delegations have 
encountered several obstacles which have put the prospect of developing a globally 
acceptable convention in question for now.111 The problems discussed above, as well as 
new challenges, have emerged during the drafting of the new treaty.  
Informal meetings of the delegations from October 2000 to April 2001 resulted in 
a new consensus requirement in which everyone has veto power.112 This has proved 
troublesome for the United States in several respects. First, all other delegations disfavor 
the concept of "general doing business jurisdiction," which the U.S. delegation 
supports.113 Additionally, the majority process of negotiation had resulted in a 1999 draft 
that was unacceptable to the U.S. delegation.114 Since the negotiations before July 2001 
were conducted under a process of majority vote, and since many of the delegations at the 
Hague Conference were either member states of the European Union (EU) or states that 
desired to enter the EU, the Draft and Interim Text resemble much of the language found 
in the Brussels Convention.115 In addition, it is understandable that members of EU states 
would prefer rules which resemble those provisions they are most accustomed to dealing 
with in their own legal systems.116
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Although the bases of general doing business jurisdiction and transient 
jurisdiction are currently prohibited under Article 18117 of the new 2001 Interim Text, 
efforts have been made to incorporate the Due Process requirement elsewhere in the 
convention. Article 10 "torts or delicts" attempts to combine both the Brussels 
Convention and Due Process concepts of specific jurisdiction discussed in the previous 
section.118 Under Article 10, a plaintiff may bring an action against a defendant not only 
in the State in which the harmful act occurred or injury arose, but also in the State into 
which a defendant has directed frequent or significant activity related to the claim, "and 
the overall connection of the defendant to that State makes it reasonable that the 
defendant be subject to suit in that State."119 Still other questions remain as of the most 
recent draft, such as whether to include a section addressing intellectual property rights, 
damages limitations, and of course, electronic commerce and similar Internet disputes. 
The previous discussion aims to illustrate the difficulties which would threaten 
the prospects of drafting a uniform treaty addressing Internet jurisdiction and recognition 
of judgments. One commentator on the subject of international treaties and trademark 
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disputes over the Internet describes the drafting of multilateral treaties as "economically 
inefficient."120 He continues: 
The high transaction costs that accompany multilateral, and 
even bilateral, negotiations necessarily imply that reaching 
a mutually acceptable agreement will require a great deal of 
time and effort. The negotiations surrounding NAFTA and 
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade demonstrate that brokering international 
agreements is an expensive and arduous process - one that 
is frequently hampered by conflicting cultural nuances.121
 
While international treaties play an essential role in opening markets and 
promoting free trade, the lethargic and complicated process of drafting multilateral 
treaties may not be a compatible solution for the demands of the ever-changing 
technological world of the Internet. 
      3. The Future of Internet Personal Jurisdiction 
      Since the Internet has "broken down many of the geographical and temporal 
premises of international law,"122 we are faced with a new challenge to keep one step 
ahead of swiftly changing technologies and must forge solutions that will enable us to 
function as a global economy over the Internet. As the previous discussion suggests, the 
most efficient solution may not be the drafting of a new multilateral treaty, particularly if 
negotiations prove too costly and time consuming to address the changing needs of the 
Internet. Additionally, as discussed earlier, many national legal systems have yet to adopt 
and test their own solutions for Internet jurisdiction domestically. Consequently there is 
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little empirical evidence of how proposed solutions might work in practice once adopted 
in an international treaty. 
     If the delegations at the Hague Conference on Private International Law can agree 
on a manageable solution to address jurisdiction over the Internet that is compatible with 
the differing focus on personal jurisdiction analysis, then it will likely be more efficient 
to include it in the text of the current draft rather than to seek the creation of a new treaty 
to independently address Internet disputes. Such a treaty would provide for a uniform set 
of rules as well as a central forum to which parties in contracting states could submit 
questions of jurisdiction. However, given the cultural and political differences between 
the United States and most other countries of the world, this could prove to be an 
insurmountable hurdle in practice. As previously discussed, many of the difficulties 
associated with such differences have already emerged as a result of the negotiations of 
the Hague Conference of Private International Law and continue to threaten the 
successful drafting of a globally acceptable treaty text. 
      A radical alternative to drafting a new treaty to address Internet personal 
jurisdiction is to modify our own national policy of personal jurisdiction, but strictly as it 
relates to Internet disputes. Previous sections of this note demonstrate that the current 
International Shoe standard is not wholly compatible with the borderless landscape of the 
Internet, particularly when tested on an international scale. In addition, Yahoo! shows us 
that litigation under our current standard is exceedingly costly and time consuming, 
requiring American companies to expend endless resources to resolve novel questions of 
Internet jurisdiction in courts both home and abroad. While e-commerce is currently in its 
infancy as part of the global economy, more disputes are likely to arise as new 
technology allows companies to conduct an increased amount of business over the 
Internet. The growth of Internet commerce demands a swift solution that will not prove 
obsolete once it goes into effect. Most importantly, the increased flow of Internet 
commerce requires a predictable test upon which businesses seeking to expand their 
activities onto the Internet can rely in the future. The current International Shoe standard 
fails to provide website operators with such a reliable test. Instead, our current standard 
of personal jurisdiction burdens website operators with great uncertainty and potential 
vulnerability to being haled into courts hundreds or perhaps thousands of miles away. 
Modifying our standard of personal jurisdiction over the Internet will allow the 
United States to enter into more acceptable multilateral agreements. Additionally, it will 
provide a more predictable rubric by which to analyze jurisdiction over the Internet when 
international disputes arise.  
      History demonstrates that such a landmark modification of personal jurisdiction 
rules may not be as radical or uncommon as one may think. As pointed out earlier, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the International Shoe standard was created in response to 
technological changes and an increased flow of interstate commerce which our nation 
witnessed more than a half century ago.123 I suggest that perhaps another such occasion 
has finally presented itself in the United States, only today the technological changes 
have strong implications for international trade as well as for domestic interstate 
commerce.  
However, any change in our standard of personal jurisdiction must comport with the 
Constitution and Due Process. Ironically, it may be the very foundations of the 
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International Shoe standard which currently threaten the Due Process of defendants in 
Internet disputes. It is well understood that the minimum contacts analysis propounded in 
International Shoe was formulated to ensure defendants are afforded Due Process when 
their interests are balanced with the interests of the forum state in exercising personal 
jurisdiction over non-residents. Nevertheless, today the minimum contacts test suffers 
from grave ambiguity when applied to the borderless landscape of the Internet. As is 
demonstrated in the case law to date, courts disagree on precisely what Internet activities 
amount to minimum contacts sufficient to allow the reasonable exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. Consequently, tests are ultimately formulated on a factual, case-by-case 
basis, thus depriving website operators of any degree of certainty as to where and when 
they might be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a foreign court. Allowing potential 
defendants to be exposed to such jurisdictional vulnerability undermines the very 
interests the Due Process Clause was originally meant to protect.  
Currently, the Supreme Court is best equipped to provide us with a solution to 
Internet personal jurisdiction, as the High Court is vested with the sole and exclusive 
authority to interpret the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. Unfortunately, the Court will 
not render an opinion on the subject until such a dispute is presented before it. Should the 
Court embrace the opportunity to rule on the issue of Internet personal jurisdiction, I 
suggest that the Court's focus should be on the Due Process prong of our current analysis. 
      There are two primary considerations which must accompany the discussion of 
modifying our standard of Due Process as it pertains to Internet disputes. First, the 
minimum contacts analysis must be refined to reflect the non-physical nature of many of 
the Internet activities from which today's disputes arise. While Zippo merely attempts to 
define special categories for the operation of websites, it fails to provide courts with 
concrete guidance on what amounts to a "contact" for purposes of Due Process. I suggest 
that in regard to Internet disputes involving contracts, contacts should be limited to those 
activities accompanied by some particularized physical nexus, including but not limited 
to: entering into a contract for Internet service, entering into a contract for sale of 
merchandise in the forum state, the unsolicited contacting of an individual by a website 
operator through means of e-mail or physical mail directing the potential customer to his 
website, or the advertisement in print, radio or television markets in the forum state 
which alert residents to the existence of a website. 
A minimum contacts analysis based upon particularized unilateral activities with a 
physical nexus promotes the key elements of personal jurisdiction so engrained in our 
system of jurisprudence: purposeful availment, foreseeability and reasonableness. When 
a website operator reaches out to a potential customer by targeting him through more 
particularized means, he is able to foresee when and where his activities might cause 
injury, and may decide for himself whether he wishes to reach out to a resident of a 
foreign jurisdiction. This conscious decision made by every website operator will allow 
for the reasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Some may argue that such a 
physical nexus requirement leaves plaintiffs in a worse position than before, requiring 
them to bring suit in foreign courts if they are injured by a website operator. However, for 
cases arising in tort, such as defamation, libel or slander, plaintiffs would not need to 
establish a physical nexus from the defendant. Instead, defendants would be subject to the 
more traditional effects test first adopted by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.124 In 
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such cases, the key elements of personal jurisdiction would again be satisfied since 
personal jurisdiction would only be exercised where the defendant takes some 
particularized unilateral action toward the plaintiff and can foresee the injurious effects 
his activities might cause in the forum state.  
A second, more complicated consideration is the implication of a modified 
standard of Due Process upon transnational Internet litigation. As mentioned earlier, a 
modified standard of Due Process would allow the United States to enter more easily into 
international agreements, such as the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. Due to the differing focus between the U.S. 
concept of Due Process and the concept of specific jurisdiction embraced by the Brussels 
Convention, negotiations for a globally acceptable treaty have been frustrated. Perhaps a 
modified, more predictable standard of Due Process with regard to the Internet might 
prove more acceptable to members of EU states where predictability and efficiency has 
traditionally been the hallmark of many regional legal systems. While the intricacies of 
such a discussion are likely beyond the scope of this paper, it raises important questions 
about the possibilities of directing negotiations towards a globally acceptable multilateral 
treaty in the near future.  
Conclusion 
The Internet has presented courts across our nation and around the world with a 
new challenge. Litigation continues to erupt and test the limits of the International Shoe 
standard as it applies to international Internet disputes. Increased litigation costs will 
likely discourage businesses from engaging in commerce over the Internet to the 
detriment of corporations and consumers alike. A solution is needed which will protect 
businesses from inconvenient or needless litigation, while ensuring more predictability 
when establishing a website which will be instantly accessible anywhere in the world. 
Any solution to Internet personal jurisdiction must be "upgradeable" such that it can be 
modified to conform to the needs of future technological advances. Finally, the solution 
must be manageable by courts in the United States and abroad. Thus, any new standard 
must comport with well-settled principles of customary international law. 
As purposeful availment, foreseeability and reasonableness have become the 
focus of Internet personal jurisdiction analyses by American courts to date, a 
modification of the current Due Process analysis is needed in order to satisfy these 
fundamental requirements. In addition, modifying our standard of personal jurisdiction 
will allow the United States to enter into more acceptable multilateral agreements 
pertaining to Internet disputes. Currently, the Supreme Court is best equipped to 
formulate a more flexible standard of personal jurisdiction over the Internet.  
As the Internet plays an increasingly important role as a medium in a global 
economy, the need for a solution to personal jurisdiction will increase proportionately. 
The traditional territorial concepts embodied in International Shoe are proving less 
effective in disputes arising out the seamless landscapes of the Internet. Until such a 
solution is found, however, our Shoe will continue to be stretched thin as it attempts to 
encompass the new technological challenges emerging in the Internet age.  
